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Abstract— Coordination between manufacturers and 
multiple buyers represents an important problem in supply 
chain management.  In this paper, we develop a supply chain 
coordination mechanism in a system with a dominant 
manufacturer that delivers seasonal products to a group of 
buyers.  These buyers have common replenishment times 
and receive delivery through a common delivery channel.  A 
twice-stage ordering and production system is introduced in 
which the first order is placed at some time in advance of the 
selling season and a second order is placed closer to the 
selling period. This reorder strategy allows the buyer to 
collect additional information about seasonal demand, 
thereby reducing demand forecast error and simultaneously 
smoothing out production time. This twice-stage model 
results in savings for both manufacturer and the buyers.  
Strategies for developing sustainable cooperation between 
manufacturers and buyers are discussed in light of the 
conclusions of this model. 
 
Keywords— Logistics, Inventory Management, Optimal Order 
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1. Introduction 
This paper discusses a supply chain coordination 
mechanism for items with seasonal demand and quantity 
discounts.  For the purposes of this discussion, buyers are 
defined as item distributors (as opposed to end 
consumers).  Buyers are assumed to be affected by 
seasonal demand for the items being ordered.  Ref. [1] 
classify item ordering (i.e. inventory replenishment) as a 
logistics decision which is “postponed in a ‘wait-and-see’ 
mode to optimize in the face of uncertainty” (p. 1219). As 
such, buyers prefer to receive orders at uneven intervals 
according to their seasonal demand requirements given 
that such order characteristics reduce uncertainty and
minimize storage costs for the buyers.  Manufacturers, 
conversely, are assumed to prefer large order quantities 
spaced equally throughout the year given that such order 
characteristics minimize production and order (i.e. 
shipping, holding, and production facility fixed costs) 
costs for the manufacturer.  Prior research has proposed a 
number of methods for supply chain coordination in the
presence of these conflicting motivations, including the 
use of credit to induce larger orders from buyers, revenue 
sharing, and twice-stage (TS) ordering and production 
systems which improve systemic coordination between 
buyers and manufacturers.  While prior research has 
explored TS systems in the context of a single buyer and 
manufacturer, the usefulness of such a system for 
coordinating multiple buyers has not been fully explored.  
This paper develops a TS model which identifies optimal 
common order replenishment times and associated savings 
for a supply chain with a single dominant manufacturer 
delivering seasonal products to multiple buyers.  
The framework introduced in this paper is applicable to 
non-agricultural seasonal goods, particularly those 
produced in a manufacturing setting.  There are a variety 
of items in common use which fit this description, 
including items associated with specific holidays (i.e. 
decorations), seasonal attire (i.e. snow jackets or 
swimwear), and other items with seasonal demand. The 
remainder of this paper will provide an overview of prior 
literature followed by a description of the mathematical 
model which underpins our framework and numerical 
examples which illustrate the optimal common order 
replenishment time within our framework.  Opportuniies 
for future extensions of this model are also proposed, 
followed by some concluding remarks. 
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2. Prior Literature 
In their paper entitled “Coordination of a single-
manufacturer/multi-buyer supply chain with credit 
option,” Ref. [2] focus their attention on a supply chain 
model where a single manufacturer sells a product to 
multiple buyers.  The authors cite the need for such a 
model given that cases of single manufacturers supplying 
a product to a single buyer are uncommon in the modern 
production environment.  Using a two-stage supply chain, 
the manufacturer supplies a product to multiple buyers 
located in different geographic areas.  Given that prior 
research has identified that approximately sixty three 
percent of annual logistics costs can be tied to 
transportation, it is not surprising that consolidation of 
deliveries results in significant savings [3]. 
Ref. [2] develop their model using two transportation 
cost scenarios.  The first is an ex-site delivery condition, 
where transportation costs are included in the product 
price and each buyer’s order is handled independently.  
The second case is an ex-factory case where the cost of 
transportation is borne by the buyers.  In both scenarios, 
coordinated product delivery at fixed intervals to multiple 
buyers sharing a common carrier reduces associated 
manufacturer and customer costs.  Manufacturer can 
induce buyers to accept deliveries at fixed, rather an the 
buyer-preferred uneven, intervals through the provisi n of 
credit. 
Ref. [4] discusses the problem of supply chain 
coordination for specific cases of seasonal products.  
Seasonal products are affected by comparatively short life 
cycles and uncertain demand.  Unsold inventory loses 
much of its value once the selling season has ended, 
making excess inventory costly to buyers.  Insufficient 
inventory acquisition, on the other hand, directly results in 
buyer welfare losses associated with forgone sales.  Thus, 
accurate forecasting of product demand is crucial for 
buyers with respect to seasonal products.  Naturally, the 
ability of the buyer to forecast product demand improves 
as the selling season approaches.  Therefore, a retaile ’s 
preference is to place orders as close to the beginning of 
the selling season (i.e. late) as possible.  Placing an order 
late, however, necessitates reductions in production time 
and results in increased costs for the manufacturer.   The 
authors propose improvements to the operating system 
which allow for coordination between retailers and 
manufacturers and profit compensation plans which lead 
supply chain coordination to Pareto improvement. Choi, 
Ref. [5] provide support for this approach by showing that 
suppliers generally benefit from sharing good information 
with a retailer. 
Ref. [6] develop a model featuring a quantity discount 
mechanism useful for facilitating supply chain 
coordination. This model is developed within a single 
product, multi-period setting where customer demand is 
probabilistic. In contrast to the model developed in our 
paper, Ref. [6] model a supply chain with a single buyer 
and manufacturer.  The authors identify bounds within 
which the quantity discount results in increased profit and 
supply chain coordination. Additionally, the authors 
develop a method for apportioning increased profits 
between the buyer and manufacturer and derive the 
optimal discount level under that method.   
For a comprehensive review of prior literature on supply 
chain coordination mechanisms, see Ref. [7]. 
 
3. Model Description 
This paper develops a twice-stage (TS) ordering and
production system model which extends the work of Re . 
[2] and Ref. [4] for use with a dominant manufacturer and 
multiple buyers.  Buyers place their first order at some 
time in advance of the selling season. A second, “late” 
order is then made closer to the selling period.  The use of 
multiple order periods (i.e. reordering late) allows the 
buyer to collect more information about seasonal demand, 
thereby reducing demand forecast error and 
simultaneously smoothing out production time [8].  
Information distortion mitigation facilitated by the TS 
model results in cost savings for both the manufactrer 
and the buyers. 
In the original model of Ref. [2], the authors calculate 
total manufacturer costs in two ways: manufacturer total 
cost with individual deliveries and manufacturer total cost 
with simultaneous deliveries to all buyers.  The authors 
then calculate the savings realized through the use of 




simultaneous deliveries instead of individual delivr es.  
We extend their analysis by introducing the 
aforementioned TS order and production system to 
account for seasonal demand as described by Ref. [4].  
The model developed in our paper introduces a scenario 
with two periods, hereafter referred to as seasons: 
Summer, the season with higher item demand, and Winter, 
the season with lower demand.  In a scenario with 
multiple buyers, it is logical to assume that buyers will 
have different order replenishment times given their 
unequal demands.  We simulate this type of scenario using 
parameters provided by Ref. [9] for a single manufacturer 
and multiple buyers. Our analysis will focus on conditions 
under which total system costs are lower when the 
manufacturer uses their optimal shipment frequency 
(which is the same for all periods) rather than that of the 
buyer (which would differ between the two periods).  
Based on those conditions, we then calculate a range 
(minimum and maximum) within which manufacturers 
can offer quantity discounts to buyers in order to induce 
compliance with the manufacturer preferred shipping 
schedule. 
To ensure conformance with other works in this area, 
we utilize the following notation from Ref. [2]: 
 
Notation: 







, where iD  is 
the demand of ith buyer 
biS  ordering cost of i
th buyer, where i = 1,..,n 
mS  setup cost of the manufacturer 
P   production rate of the manufacturer, DP >  
bih  holding cost of i
th buyer, where i = 1,..,n 
mh  holding cost of the manufacturer 
it  individual optimum order interval of i
th buyer 
(decision variable) 
t   individual optimum production run length of the 
manufacturer (decision variable) 
itc  minimum credit time required by i
th buyer 
(decision variable) 
T  common order replenishment time (decision 
variable) 
K  integer lot size multiplier (decision variable) 
vQ  economic production quantity of the 
manufacturer  
iQ       economic order quantity of i
th  buyer 
TCM  total relevant cost per unit time of the 
manufacturer 
iC  individual transportation cost per delivery borne 
by the manufacturer 
cC  common transportation cost per delivery borne 
by the manufacturer 
mβ  average inventory factor at manufacturer’s side, 
i.e., ( ) mKK ρ)2(1 −−−  
mρ       utilization rate of the manufacturer, P
D
, where 
10 ≤< mρ  
 
The following results in Eqs. (1) - (4), from Ref. [2] are 
subsequently utilized in our computational model. 
With no coordination, the manufacturer and the buyers 
optimize their costs independently and the manufactrer 
delivers the items to every buyer individually. Thus, the 
manufacturer’s total relevant cost per unit of time, 
denoted bcTCM , is equal to the sum of the 
manufacturer’s setup cost, order processing cost 
(including individual transportation cost), and inve tory 














       
When the coordination through the common order 
replenishment time (T) is implemented, the 
manufacturer’s total relevant cost is obtained by Eq. (2) 
below, which is the sum of setup cost, common 
transportation cost including order processing cost, 
inventory holding cost and compensation cost. Notice that 
the manufacturer, with the coordination, incurs additional 
(compensation) cost - which will be given to buyers to 




offset their increased costs. Buyer’s increased costs are 
mainly inventory costs that are incurred due to the c ange 
of order interval from the buyer’s optimal ti o the 
common replenishment time T. The amount of 
compensation is the difference between the total costs 
before and after the coordination as shown in the last term 
of Eq. (2). In this paper, the compensation is assumed to 
be given to the buyers in the form of quantity discount or 
other types of credit.  

















































  (2) 
The manufacturer’s savings in this coordination 
mechanism are expected to be greater than the 
compensation costs given to all the buyers, given that the 
common order replenishment time is optimized. The 
optimal common order replenishment time *T , is 
calculated using the following equation, which is obtained 























  (3) 
We now substitute the value of *T in Eq. (3) to Eq. (2) 
and optimize with respect to K. The optimal integer value 
of lot size multiplier, denoted by K0, is obtained by 
selecting ,0KK =  such that 
( ) ( )∩−≤ 100 KZKZ ( ) ( )100 +≤ KZKZ . The 
optimal integer value 0K is the one that satisfies the 























    (4) 
The optimal K is substituted to Eq. (3) to find the 
optimal T, which in return is substituted back to Eq. (2) to 
find the manufacturer’s optimal total costs. In the 
following numerical example section, we apply the above 
results to the case where the demand shows typical 
seasonality patterns. 
 
4. Numerical Analysis 
 
Table 1 provides data from Ref. [9] related to the Summer 
Season case, consistent with the analysis of Ref. [2]. 
 











1 8 20 0.008 40 
2 15 15 0.009 40 
3 10 6 0.01 40 
4 5 10 0.01 40 
5 20 18 0.007 40 
 
Table 2 provides similar data for the Winter Season 
case, a second period where demand is lower than 
observed in the Summer Season case. 
 











1 6 20 0.008 40 
2 11 15 0.009 40 
3 7 6 0.01 40 
4 3 10 0.01 40 
5 12 18 0.007 40 
 
We also consider parameters related to manufacturer 
costs and total item demand in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Other Relevant Model Parameters 
P 193.333 Production Rate of the Manufacturer 
Sm 250 Setup Cost of the Manufacturer 
hm 0.005 Holding Cost  of the Manufacturer 
Cc 100 Common Transportation Cost per 
Delivery (borne by manufacturer) 
D 58 Total Demand 
ρm 0.300 Utilization Rate (D/P) 
 




In order to address the different demand sizes in two 
periods, we utilize the model developed by Ref. [2] to 
analyse the identified supply chain problem: a 
manufacturing firm facing two seasons, each with 
different demands.  The model can be applied separately 
to the Summer (higher demand period) and Winter (lower 
demand period), with separate consideration yielding two 
different common replenishment times (T1 and T2, 
respectively for the Summer and Winter season).  Such 
analysis will also yield different cost savings (i.e. the 
common replenishment time case vs. the no coordination 
case) for each demand period. 
For the scenario utilizing the values given in Tables 1 
through 3 above, analysis (Eqn. 3) yields T1=27.47 and 
cost saving of $59.39 for the summer season.  For the 
winter season, analysis yields T2=33.43 and cost savings 
of $31.52.  Costs are given as cost per unit of time. 
Appendix A and B provide supporting numerical 
calculations for the Summer and Winter season cases, 
respectively.  Assuming that each period, summer and
winter, is of equal length, the individual period costs 
savings can be averaged over both periods by calculating 
their sum and dividing by two.  Average savings between 
the two periods, therefore, is $45.45.  
Given the aforementioned manufacturer preference for 
the cost benefits of large order quantities at fixed, qually 
spaced intervals, higher average savings may be achi ved 
by using the same common replenishment time (T) for 
both seasons rather than the season-specific values of T 
calculated previously.  A detailed numerical analysis of 
the savings associated with using the same T for both 
periods is provided in the appendices. This analysis i  
performed using the value of T which optimizes 
manufacturer savings for both periods. Appendix C 
describes the effects of using that optimal value of T*(K) 
(calculated as 96.20 in our analysis) on Summer season 
savings for the two-period model, while Appendix D 
describes similar outcomes for the Winter season savings. 
The selection of an optimal value for T*(K) used in both 
seasons leads to average cost savings as high as $81.52, 
representing an improvement of 79.36% over the average 
savings previously noted across the two base seasonal 
cases. 
 
5. Practical Applications and Proposed 
Extensions 
The developed model highlights the desirability of supply 
chain coordination between a manufacturer and buyers for 
products with seasonal demand patterns.  Such an 
approach is highly applicable to a number of industrie  
including the replenishment of frozen goods for 
supermarket stores [10], as well as B2B electronic markets 
[11].  To make such coordination practicable, a 
coordination framework must be developed which 
specifies mutually beneficial methods of cooperation.  
Selecting a coordination mechanism is an important 
tactical-strategic decision [12].  In order to support the 
model developed in this paper, an attempt is made to 
suggest and analyse methodological approaches to supply 
chain coordination between a manufacturer and 
distributors which result in total system cost miniization 
for both the production and distribution processes. A 
cooperation framework which successfully promotes thi
type of cooperative behaviour must naturally involve 
appropriate incentive alignment between the parties [13].  
Prior literature has highlighted the limitations of revenue-
sharing contracts for incentive alignment and cooperation.  
Specifically, Ref. [14] demonstrate that supply chains 
within which the buyer has some influence over demand 
through their actions or where they compete with oter 
companies on both price and quantity may not achieve 
coordination through revenue-sharing contracts. Mutual 
agreement based on concessions between delivery size 
and interval, as described in our model, may be more 
practicable given the aforementioned limitations of
revenue-sharing. We provide, therefore, two approaches 
which might allow for a sustained cooperation framework 









Manufacturer discounts in exchange for manufacturer 
preferred delivery schedule 
Cooperation between the manufacturer and buyers can be 
induced by the manufacturer providing both a quantity 
discount and a constant reorder interval discount.  In 
exchange for these concessions, the buyers agree to 
receive seasonal goods in equal size batches througout 
the year.  The manufacturer benefits from such an 
arrangement through reduced production costs achieved 
by eliminating the usual spikes in demand associated with 
seasonal goods.   Regular shipments also allow the 
manufacturer to better manage the production schedule, 
possibly leading to lower capacity requirements.  
Assuming the manufacturer sets discounts at appropriate 
levels, the buyers are able to benefit from such an 
arrangement by offsetting storage costs through the rec ipt 
of those discounts.  Examples of seasonal goods which 
might benefit from such an arrangement are seasonal 
apparel (e.g. winter coats or swimwear), holiday 
paraphernalia (e.g. items used for Christmas, Chanukah, 
or Diwali), and seasonal sports goods (e.g. skis).  We can 
assess the feasibility of cooperation in this scenario by 
comparing the highest amount the manufacturer is willing 
to pay and the lowest among the buyers are willing to 
accept.  Sustainability of this cooperative solution requires 
the first amount to exceed the second.  
 
Mutual agreement on concessions between delivery size 
and interval 
Cooperation can also be sustained through bargaining 
between the manufacturer and the buyer with respect to 
delivery parameters.  Given the manufacturer’s stated 
preference for fixed and equally spaced delivery intervals 
with large order quantities, and the buyer’s stated 
preference for unequally spaced delivery intervals with 
demand-specified order amounts, it is logical that delivery 
size and interval would be areas of negotiation betwe n 
the two parties.  Specifically, buyers could make 
concessions in the size of their orders while manufct rers 
could agree to concessions in the delivery schedule.  Such 
a solution would be sustainable in the presence of 
mutually beneficial trade-offs between these delivery 
parameters. 
It is important to recognize that individual firm 
characteristics have a significant impact on a cooperative 
solution such as this.  Identification of delivery parameter 
specifications at which buyers and manufacturers are able 
to make mutually beneficial trade-offs between delivery 
size and schedule, for instance, requires an examination of 
relative cost structures between the buyer and 
manufacturer.  It is clear that a manufacturer might have 
higher costs in certain areas as compared to buyers, 
whereas buyers might have cost advantages in other areas.  
Minimizing total system costs, therefore, will include 
shifting costs to the party which has a comparative cost 
advantage relative to that cost.  Cost sharing, as with
coordinated advertising, is an additional mechanism by 
which firms may maximize system profits while 
simultaneously minimizing system costs [15]. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper provides analysis of a supply chain for items 
with seasonal demand and quantity discounts.  The 
developed model analyses conditions under which total 
system costs are lower when the manufacturer uses their 
optimal shipment frequency rather than that of the buyers.  
First such condition is manufacturer’s preference for large 
order quantities spaced equally throughout the year in 
order to minimize their production and order costs.  The 
second condition is that the savings manufacturer realizes 
by using the same common replenishment time (T) for 
both seasons rather than the season-specific T’s exceed the 
combined additional costs buyers incur by accepting 
deliveries in equal size batches throughout the year.  The 
analysis clearly shows that such conditions exist and 
delivers mutual benefits to both the manufacturer and the 
buyers, provided that a cooperative solution can be 
reached which promotes the necessary supply chain 
coordination.  A game theoretic approach (e.g. 
Stackelberg Equilibrium) could also be used for problems 
of our type [16]. 
The cooperative solutions discussed above illustrate the 
benefits which can be achieved through the coordinatio  




of production and purchase activity.  Mutual benefits ( n 
the form of higher profits) can be achieved for both 
manufacturers and buyers by utilizing comparative 
advantages to lower system costs.   
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Appendix A: Summer Season Base Case 
 
Panel A: Economic Order Intervals of the ith Buyer (ti) 
and Determination of K0 
 
t1 25   C1*D1/Q1 12.8 
t2 14.91  
C2*D2/Q2 40.25 
t3 10.95  
C3*D3/Q3 36.51 
t4 20  
C4*D4/Q4 10 





   
  
  
   
  
Determine K0     
  
     
k0 2     
k0*(k0-1) 2 <= 2.72   
k0*(k0+1) 6 >= 2.72   
 
 
Panel B: Total Relevant Manufacturer Costs (TCM), total 
savings, and minimum credit times (tc) 
 
Qv   2878.49   
[Eq. 4] K0(K0-1)<= 2.72 <=K0(K0+1) 
  K 2   
  βm 1   
T*(K) [Eq. 3) 
 
27.47 
  TCMbc [Eq. 
1]  
157.28 
TCMcommon repl   97.89   
Total savings 
 




    
tc1(min)  
0.11   
tc2(min)  
2.87   
tc3(min)  
4.97   
tc4(min)  
1.02   
tc5(min)  
2.38   













Appendix B: Winter Season Base Case 
 
Panel A: Economic Order Intervals of the ith Buyer (ti) 
and Determination of K0 
 
t1 28.87   C1*D 1/Q1 8.31 
t2 17.41  
C2*D2/Q2 25.28 
t3 13.09  
C3*D 3/Q3 21.39 
t4 25.82  
C4*D 4/Q4 4.65 
t5 20.70   C5*D 5/Q5 23.19 
t 60.52  
Sum 82.81 
  
   
  
  
   
  
Determine K0     
  
     
k0 2     
k0*(k0-1) 2 <= 2.74   
k0*(k0+1) 6 >= 2.74   
 
 
Panel B: Total Relevant Manufacturer Costs (TCM), total 
savings, and minimum credit times (tc) 
 






  K 2   










  57.71   
Total 
savings  




    
tc1(min)  
0.31   
tc2(min)  
3.84   
tc3(min)  
6.19   
tc4(min)  
0.87   
tc5(min)  
2.42   
Max of min credit times 6.19   
 




Appendix C: Same T for two seasons (Summer) 
 
Panel A: Economic Order Intervals of the ith Buyer (ti) 
and Determination of K0 
 
t1 25.00   C1*D1/Q1 12.80 
t2 14.91  
C2*D2/Q2 40.25 
t3 10.95  
C3*D3/Q3 36.51 
t4 20.00  
C4*D4/Q4 10.00 
t5 16.04   C5*D5/Q5 49.89 
t 49.63  
Sum 149.45 
  
   
  
  
   
  
Determine K0     
  
     
k0 2     
k0*(k0-1) 2 <= 2.72   
k0*(k0+1) 6 >= 2.72   
 
 
Panel B: Total Relevant Manufacturer Costs (TCM), total 
savings, and minimum credit times (tc) 
 






  K 2   
  βm 1   




TCMbc [Eq. 1]  
164.25 
TCMcommon repl   56.69   
Total savings 
 
107.56   
     
    
tc1(min)  
26.35   
tc2(min)  
34.35   
tc3(min)  
37.77   
tc4(min)  
30.18   
tc5(min)  
33.40   






Appendix D: Same T for two seasons (Winter) 
 
Panel A: Economic Order Intervals of the ith Buyer (ti) 
and Determination of K0 
 
t1 28.87   C1*D 1/Q1 8.31 
t2 17.41  
C2*D2/Q2 25.28 
t3 13.09  
C3*D 3/Q3 21.39 
t4 25.82  
C4*D 4/Q4 4.65 
t5 20.70   C5*D 5/Q5 23.19 
t 60.52  
Sum 82.81 
  
   
  
  
   
  
Determine K0     
  
     
k0 2     
k0*(k0-1) 2 <= 2.74   
k0*(k0+1) 6 >= 2.74   
 
 
Panel B: Total Relevant Manufacturer Costs (TCM), total 
savings, and minimum credit times (tc) 
 






  K 2   
  βm 1   




TCMbc [Eq. 1]  
93.51 
TCMcommon repl   38.03   
Total savings 
 




 81.52   
    
tc1(min)  
23.57   
tc2(min)  
32.27   
tc3(min)  
35.90   
tc4(min)  
25.75   
tc5(min)  
29.63   
Max of min credit times 35.90   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
